By Teguh Ganesha
Mr. Blandin begins the roundtable. Thuy, N. N. (2025). TIU IRSA.
On April 17, Professor Jeffrey Ordaniel hosted policy analyst and Paris Catholic University PhD student Benjamin Blandin for a special roundtable discussion. His research focus primarily concerns Asian security—with Professor Ordaniel’s class on US Policy Towards Asia being given a firsthand look into his PhD research on the South China Sea disputes.
Mr. Blandin’s research focuses on accurately mapping exact territorial claims and control in the contested region—revealing surprising gaps between published maps and reality. He first noted how these disputes have been an academic and popular debate hotspot for some time now, with news agencies and governments covering the issue. Perhaps the most eye-catching parts of these publications are maps of territorial control and claims over the area.
Territorial claims in the South China Sea. Burgess, J. (2013). New York Times.
“Some features are completely missing, while others show incorrect territorial control.”
Mr. Blandin points out several issues with these maps using satellite imagery from Google Earth. Some features were outright missing—with Mr. Blandin pointing out that several features in the Rifleman Bank area were unmapped as one example. He also noted that some maps painted new features that didn’t exist, or mapped a country’s control over a feature when control wasn’t theirs. He narrated one instance of another researcher asking for advice on their map of the South China Sea, where Mr. Blandin found several inaccuracies which he helped correct.
“That the New York Times, other media outlets, the US government, and several researchers would get something as fundamental as a map wrong is absurd.”
He notes that these mistakes would already be strange if given by any institution, academic, press, government, or otherwise, especially considering how necessary it is to effectively map these high-stakes territorial disputes. Of course, he notes that tracking the exact coordinates of the features was tedious—himself having trouble scrolling through the map to find one particular feature, but the point stands. That glaring factual inaccuracies are published and used in both popular and academic discourse is a wake-up call for all of us to do the bare minimum—check your sources.
Mr. Blandin points out factual inaccuracies on several maps. Thuy, N. N. (2025). TIU IRSA.
On his map of the South China Sea, participants also had the opportunity to see satellite images of recently constructed missile silos, listening posts, and outposts from a variety of countries, giving an overview of the region’s defence capabilities. Using Việt Nam as a case study, Blandin revealed that approximately 90% of the country’s military infrastructure on South China Sea features didn’t exist just three years ago. He contrasted this with the Philippines’ approach of developing naval capabilities rather than static infrastructure.
During the discussion, Mr. Blandin explored the historical context of these disputes from the US’ involvement in the region, to the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. He notes here that the South China Sea was simply the South Sea—that is, before British mapmakers wrote South China Sea on the region and decided it looked better.
By the exact terms of UNCLOS—which is extensively covered in Professor Ordaniel’s Maritime Security and Ocean Governance course, for students who may be interested—the features in the South China Sea would be outside of most country’s maritime entitlements, lying in the Area (ominously named, but quite benign) as part of the common heritage of mankind (shorthand for ‘owned by all’). Before UNCLOS, Mr. Blandin also noted that several of the features themselves were unowned and unclaimed terra nullius—which is to say that no one cared about them.
Interest surged only when post-colonial states such as the Philippines, Việt Nam, and Malaysia began claiming territories, following patterns established by their former colonizers. Here, the roundtable turned to two particular episodes—one of Filipino sovereignty markers being moved around by vessels from Việt Nam, and another of China occupying several features following the withdrawal of soldiers from Việt Nam that took shelter from a storm.
Mr. Blandin also spoke briefly of China’s actions and claims in the region. He starts by noting that Chinese maritime claims started with Taiwan in 1949, and simply kept changing. He noted that the Party first claimed that the southernmost point of China is the island of Hainan—before promptly changing it again and again, before eventually publishing the Nine-Dash Line, which he additionally notes is a near, if not, copy of concept maps from the Kuomintang’s maps in 1948 before they were effectively exiled to Taiwan.
In contrast, he noted that Indonesia and Malaysia tend to have a strange gap between what they say and what they do, seemingly content with receiving investments from China to stay silent on most issues. Meanwhile, the Philippines has changed to referring to the South China Sea as the West Philippines Sea while improving its naval capabilities—actions taken as “megaphone diplomacy” by some, others suggesting more diplomatic actions. However, as Mr. Blandin himself notes:
“You’re not the one on the end of the beating.”
He additionally notes that China does conduct some diplomatic efforts, but usually only to put up a good front. JREAs, or Joint Resource Exploitation Areas, for example, are near constantly exploited by a China that rushes for unilateral profits to the exclusion of its partner. Another example is emergency lines of contact to deescelate crisis scenarios—something obviously good on paper, but falls apart the moment China doesn’t answer the line. Like an ex, as Professor Ordaniel would put it. This strategic concept in the South China Sea of “Unrestricted Warfare” is quite telling of the gap between diplomatic gestures and actions.
Overall, things on paper aren’t exactly as accurate as the things in reality. Though the students in the roundtable—younger than Mr. Blandin—weren’t as experienced as him, the experience was an important lesson in comparing and contrasting between different sources, and importantly, verifying yourself the information you’d put on paper.